The response of distinguished practitioners and jurists to the call to serve on the committees already appointed in the various districts to consider and make suggestions as to the new rules 4 shows not only the greatest interest but an intense desire on the part of lawyers to see that the plan is carried to a successful conclusion. Now that the Court has so promptly chosen the one workable way of making the plan effective, we can feel confident that this reform, so long supported by the American Bar Association and pressed to such dramatic legislative success a year ago by the Attorney General, will be real, complete, and lasting.
In view of these developments the detailed discussion which we had contemplated for this article seems no longer desirable. Since, however, certain differences in methods of achieving the united system are still possible or arguable within the limits of the plan as now adopted by the Court, we think it profitable to point out these possibilities, at least in summary form. Accordingly we discuss briefly the ways of providing for the union of law and equity, and the rules of pleading and of parties and joinder of actions which may be developed by using the Uniform Equity Rules of 1912 as a basis for action. These will provide the central framework of the new structure, although many important details dealing with matters as important as evidence and appellate review, process, venue, summary judgments, declaratory judgments, discovery, and motion and trial practice must be left for consideration at another time.6
I. THE UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY
At least three possible models may be considered in planning the new federal rules for a united system of law and equity. One is in substance what might be termed the "hangover" system, since it still maintains a formal division, the separate law and equity dockets being maintained, although comparatively free interchange is permitted. It may be that the new ,Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1934 is of this form, since its chief annotators apparently so interpret certain ambiguous 4. As to these committees, appointed by the judges at the suggestion of the Attorney General acting for the Court, see (1935) 20 MAss. L. Q. 41-44; 2 U. S. L. Week, March 19, 1935 , at 661, 676; 18 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 163, 164. 5. As to evidence we have already indicated our tentative conclusions in favor of "a uniform and unified federal system of rules of evidence such as now exists in the equity and admiralty cases and under most recent decisions, in the criminal law cases." Clark and Moore, supra note 1, at 415. As to appellate review we have urged a single form of review, and the abolition of a separate type of review in law and equity cases. provisions.' Another is the historic code practice of New York, which, although desirable in purpose, was limited in practical operation because of unfortunately ambiguous and narrowly interpreted provisions for jury trial and its waiver. And finally there is the effective system exemplified by the English and Connecticut practice of substantially complete union, with jury trial preserved except where waived by failure to claim it. Thjatter we urge as the model to be followed. ' As to the first plan, it may well be said that it is not different enough from the present federal system to justify the change, and that it is already foreclosed by the Supreme Court's determination to provide for a real union. In any event we believe it should not be followed. It operates to preserve the form after the substance has been rejected as undesirable. That is, it forces a determination of the difficult and confused distinction between law and equity for a more unsubstantial purpose than in the old days. Then, at least, the distinction meant the difference between a trial before a common law judge and jury in King's Bench or the Court of Common Pleas or before the Chancellor alone in the court of chancery; now it means simply a shift from one calendar to another. In this connection we may repeat what the senior author hereof said in discussing the Illinois Act:
"Amalgamation of law and equity and abolition of forms of action is often objected to on the grounds that legal and equitable remedies are inherently different and that our law of rights grew out of our law of remedies. This is true but not particularly apt or pertinent to the problem how to get the issues in our modem cases most quickly and effectively before the court. The daily grist of a trial court is composed largely of contract and negligence cases wherein it little boots any one to puzzle over the ancient distinctions among debt, covenant, account and assumpsit, general and special, or between trespass and case. In the more involved cases concerning our complex commercial life involving corporations and business trusts, debenture bonds and trust receipts, receiverships and reorganizations, and new and unprecedented state and federal legislation, there is little occasion, at the issuc-formidating stage of the case, to go back on historical excursions. Moreover where a judge is sitting without a jury, as he does more and more when dockets become crowded and jury waver automatic, it is not going to help him much in deciding whether or not to issue or continue an injunction to recall that once on a time there was an historic struggle between Coke and Ellsmere in which equity triumphed.
It is true that occasionally at the trial such historical study may be apt and pertinent; but it should be made only when it is of actual importance. So the difference in form of trial between equity and law, so much emphasized by our pleading pundits, may at times engage the court's attention and call for a real determination after a claim for jury trial is actually made. There is no occasion to consider this or others of these historical difficulties as forming iron limitations within which the pleadings must be held for fear of the occasional case which at trial may present the question. Too much fear has been expressed of dangers which in most cases will not arise at all and which can be met and disposed of without difficulty when they do arise. Thus the remote danger that a possible litigant may at some time be deprived of his jury trial right by a failure of the court to perceive some of the historical connotations of his case is too unsubstantial a basis to justify ancient formalism in pleading in all cases."1 7
The recently published report of the "Study of the Business of the Federal Courts" shows that the bulk of the federal court litigation is not greatly different in totals than as above indicated. Of all federal civil cases only a few over three per cent reach the stage of a jury verdict, and twenty-seven per cent reach the stage of court decision. The great majority of the cases are terminated before trial is reached. Outside of the prohibition injunction cases (important at the time the Study was made), the law cases are more numerous than the equity cases and of these the suits of negligence (under the Employers' Liability Act and seamen's actions) bulk largest, followed by simple contract actions. 8 In other words, in the federal courts, as in the state courts, there is a large amount of ordinary litigation, the greater part of which does not go to trial, and for which simple and direct forms of pleading are desirable. The pleading stage of the litigation ought not to be complicated by questions as to the form of trial which are not then at issue and in the great majority of cases may never be at issue. Much of the remaining federal litigation is of a specialized and novel nature due to the new federal acts, where the ancient distinctions are not in point anyhow. In other words, retention of the distinction is no gain but involves much loss in delay and confusion and possible substantial errors of justice.
The complications made necessary by preservation of even the formal distinctions may be recalled by noting the difficulties, listed in our former article, still obtaining in the federal system, notwithstanding the comparatively free transfer of cases from docket to docket permitted after the Law and Equity Act of 1915. Among the matters now in dis-pute in the lower federal courts are:' the effect of error in bringing the case to the wrong side of the court (whether the error may be waived, whether the point may or should be raised by the court, the manner and extent of formal correction and whether it may be made during trial and the effect on the form of trial); the same problem presented even more acutely when the error is found only after the action has reached the appellate court (whether the point is now waived or is unsubstantial, whether there must be a reversal and order of transfer with new trial, or reversal and dismissal of the action); whether, in default of express provision, legal and equitable claims may be combined in a single suit and the cognate question, upon which the courts have divided, whether the equitable claim may be brought in by way of the plaintiff's replication; how far, in default of express provision, a legal counterclaim may be filed in an equitable action, and, if so, whether the right to a jury trial is lost;'" the difficulties caused by the fact that the defendant may, but is not required, to plead equitable defenses in actions at law and hence may bring his own separate suit in equity on the same transaction already in litigation at law; the doubt whether third parties may be brought in to answer to an equitable defense in which they are involved or whether separate suits must be required, and so on. Moreover, the prime questions of the form of trial, court or jury, and the form of appellate review-of the facts, as in equity, or only on the law-are still not thoroughly settled as to the various combinations of law and equity now permitted; though the Liberty Oil case settled the practice, at least so far as equitable defenses are concerned, in accordance with the better view that these matters were determined by the nature of the issues and not by the "side" of the court to which the action had been brought. 1 1 If this unnecessary and wasteful confusion is to be avoided, nothing short of a provision as extensive as that of the original Field code providing for the single form of civil action and abolishing "the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing" will be sufficient. It should be made clear also that all matters of defense or counterclaim, whether legal or equitable, should be pleaded.' -9. For documentation of these points, see cases cited and discussed in Clark and Moore, supra note 1, at 416-435.
10. The view apparently is that since jury trial is waived, the plaintiff may object to the filing of the counterclaim. Clark and Moore, supra note 1, at 426. Under the ccdes the counterclaim may be fled as matter of right and the trial is to the court. See citations note 6, supra. 
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When this is done, the next important point concerns jury trial and waiver. Here the original New York code has caused difficulties. It listed the kinds of actions in which jury trial might be had, and thereby raised the question, troublesome ever since, as to whether the statute was merely declaratory of the constitutional right of jury trial or added to it; it also provided in effect for jury waiver by affirmative action and thus raised troublesome questions as to when a waiver had occurred. Now the better construction of the New York statute on jury trials 1 8 is that it is declaratory only, and that when, for example, it gives the right of a jury trial in "an action in which the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only," it does not include claims for balances due on an accounting; and when it grants a jury trial in an action "for a nuisance," it refers to the old common law action of nuisance and not a suit to enjoin a nuisance. 4 But the New York courts have not been wholly consistent and notably in the pleading of equitable defenses or counterclaims have allowed not the issue, but the form of complaint to govern. In ultimate analysis the difference between a defense and a counterclaim is illusory; and yet the right to a jury trial is rested upon this unsubstantial basis.'" The right should not depend on matters essentially of nomenclature only, but on the historical method of trying the particular issue. 6 That is the right safeguarded by the Constitution, no more and no less.
The statute should therefore declare this historical test in unambiguous terms. This is achieved, for example, in the Connecticut statute giving the right of trial by jury in "civil actions involving such an issue as, prior to January 1, 1880 (the effective date of the code), would not 13. N. Y. C. P. A. § 425, providing for a jury trial (unless waived or a reference Is directed) of issues of fact "in each of the following actions": "1. An action in which the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only. 2. An action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for a nuisance; or to recover a chattel." The usual code provision (taken from the original New York code) designates the jury actions as those "for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract, or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries." CAL. CODE Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925) . This decision is criticized by Clark, supra note 14, at 490-498; and in COon PLR=-3o at 63, 64, 430, 431; (1926) 16. In the Susquehanna case the court reserved to itself the right to determine whether the matter pleaded was a defense or counterclaim; but so illusory was the test that In the long run the mere form or name of the pleading is likely to be determinative. See articles cited note 15, supra.
[Vol. 44 present a question properly cognizable in equity."' 7 Provisions similar in form and purpose should be drafted for the new federal procedure.' 8 Finally, to make the procedure completely workable, there should be adequate provisions for waiver of trial by jury. Parties really desirous of their constitutional right and seasonably asserting it should of course be entitled to it; but the matter should not be left in doubt until the trial is had. Particularly should it not be possible for a party to gamble on the result and, by keeping his position ambiguous, be able to assert his claim for a jury after he has lost out on trial to the judge. This has happened under the original code provisions in New York. Under this code, waiver in effect is only by express affirmative action or by going to trial to the court. 19 This statute, narrowly construed as it has been, has enabled a defendant who knew what the issue was from the beginning to obtain a reversal and new trial, if not dismissal of the case after it had gone against him. The plaintiff had set forth his facts and erroneously claimed equitable relief; the defendant had answered, without claim of jury trial, but alleging facts which showed the action to be legal; then after his, liability to damages had been shown at trial, he obtained a reversal because of the wrong form of trial.2 0 To avoid such opportunity to speculate on the outcome, the right to jury trial should be held waived unless claimed in writing within a speci-17. CosNe. GFra. STAT. (1930) § 5624; cf. ComN. P.pc. Bz. (1934) § 39: "All matters which, prior to January 1, 1880, were within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, whether directly or as an incident to other matters before it, unless otherwise ordered, shall ke heard and decided by the court without a jury, in the manner theretofore practiced in courts of equity.' Section 5624 is a lengthy statute which directs the court clerk to keep a docket wherein he shall enter as "jury cases" all actions within the provisions quoted and certain other specified actions such as probate appeals affecting the validity of the wills, provided written request for jury trial has been made to the clerk within thirty days after the return day of the case or ten days after an issue of fact is joined or upon written consent of all parties or by order of court; other cases All be entered on the docket as "court cases" and shall be tried to the court. Rules of court also carry out the system, e.g., Co-eN. Pimc. Br. (1934) § § 130, 132, 136, 148, 149, 152, 153. 18. See also L,n. Ascs. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 437: "Issues of law and issues of fact in causes that prior to the 18th day of June, 1852, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction shall be tried by the court," etc.; cf. Ky. CoDEs (Carroll, 1919) § § 6, 11, 12, "actions of which courts of chancery had jurisdiction before the first day of August, 1851," etc.; [Vol. 44 fled time after the action is brought or issue joined. This is already the rule in many states, 21 and has recently been made the rule in the New York counties which comprise the City of New York. 2 It satisfies the constitutional requirement.'e It clarifies the situation long before trial, and makes unlikely rulings such as that just cited wherein the pleader's theory of the action, rather than the issues raised upon the facts, is permitted to determine this important right. 24 Under provisions such as these a workable union of law and equity is effected. The pleading stage of the trial is used to develop the respective stories of the parties as to the past events out of which the lawsuit has grown. It is not hampered by worry and confusion about the form of trial. (That is being taken care of by an entirely separate written claim or by the rule of automatic waiver of jury trial.) There is no question, in any event, as to the form of trial unless a party seasonably makes definite written claim for it; otherwise the case goes automatically on the judge's calendar for trial without jury. There are no separate "sides" of the court and no separation of law and equity cases. For convenience in dispatch of court business, the jury cases may be heard successively, and then the court cases. That is the only division of business.
In practice, the case will go automatically on the jury calendar if there is a timely demand, unless the opposing party objects. If objection is made, then and then only will the issue of the form of trial become important, and it will be settled by an examination of the historical precedents." This simple system has made possible the smooth operation of the most successful Anglo-Saxon pleading systems, as in England and her colonies, and in Connecticut, California and other Western states.
H. THE PLEADiNGS
In providing for the pleadings of the parties in the new federal civil action, advantage may be taken of the model furnished by the Uniform Equity Rules. In general, these rules (notably rules 18-21, 24, 25, 29-35)"s set forth not merely the best thought in English and American procedure of the date when they were adopted, but even of the present time. Of course they deserve careful examination, first, to make sure of wording, so that they are made applicable not merely to suits in equity but to all civil proceedings, second, to see if the form of expression can be improved upon, having in mind, however, that the words used may have a value merely because they are familiar to the profession, and, third, to see whether details can be improved, and desirable additions of newer devices (e. g., motion for summary judgments) made. Without attempting final judgments on all these details, we now consider the framework supplied by the existing equity practice and the law practice under the Conformity Act. a) Pleading objectives; liberal construction; amendment Under the present system the Conformity Act controls actions at law so that the federal attitude toward the pleadings in law actions is determined by that of the state where the federal district court is sitting. Thus pleadings have been construed strictly in some states and liberally in others; 29 immaterial when not made, in general accord with the attitude of the applicable state practice toward variance and failure of proof." The most important problem arises at the trial and may be thus stated: Can the pleadings be now amended to let in proffered proof or to cover proof already in without injustice to the adverse party, either by way of misleading him, or by depriving him of the form of trial to which he is rightfully entitled, as where the litigation was begun as an "equity" suit and is about to be terminated by an award of "legal" relief, or vice versa? 31 In either situation, however, amendment should be freely had, for nothing is to be gained under a unified procedure in forcing the parties to start over. Where the parties have been really deprived of the trial to which they are rightfully entitled, it may be necessary that a new trial be ordered; but more often, the parties should be held to knowledge of all possible rights which might flow from the facts alleged and thus to have waived a right of trial which they had not promptly claimed. If the parties have fairly litigated the transaction giving rise to the dispute, and on the proof one of them is entitled to substantive relief, then variance or failure of proof is usually only a peg upon which counsel may hang an argument, occasionally to sustain an erroneous decision," 2 but more often to reverse an obviously sound result." Uniform Equity Rules 19 and 28 provide for liberal amendments and As to the effect of present federal legislation on amendments, see Clark and Moore, supra note 1, at 409-410, n. 105. , 1925) (here judgment was reversed becauso the complaint did not state a cause of action, and hence could not be aided by a general finding, although both parties had disregarded their pleadings to a great extent; the lack of amendment seems a purely formal matter).
See
command that error not affecting the substantial rights of the parties be disregarded at every stage of the proceeding. The practice under these rules has been quite in the spirit in which they were drawn t Since it accords -with the best state practice and that now followed on the law side of the federal courts in these states, these rules indicate a desirable form for the new procedure.
b) The Complaint
Since the state practice is followed on the law side, pursuant to the Conformity principle, we find in the federal cases at law the same difficulties as to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations as in the states. Common law pleading was devoted to the development of an issue; with the development of code pleading and other modern systems, less emphasis was placed upon the issues and more on presenting the facts. The reason for this was in the main the endeavor to avoid the necessity arising under the common law forms of the moving party deciding at his peril on the correct legal theory applicable to his case. Typically under modern pleading, therefore, the plaintiff states what happened and the court is called upon to apply the law to it. But too great insistence upon pleadings alone was made by the early code courts, and fine distinctions between "facts" on the one hand, and "law" or "evidence" on the other, were drawn. Now it has come to be appreciated that the distinction is one between generality and particularity in stating the transaction sued upon and that considerable flexibility should be accorded the pleader. 5 The federal practice, which has also reflected this dispute, has like the states held that stricter rules of specific allegation are required only if particularity is seasonably demanded, and objections of this kind raised at or after trial are not to be met with favor.c 0 So, in an action 34. "No variance between the pleadings and the proofs is material unless of a character to mislead the opposite party." 2 FosmTn, FEDERAL PirLmcE (1920) 1165 (citing casas); see also Snxnss, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE (1934) 4th, 1911) (after verdict the entire declaration may be looked to in determining whether defendant was sufficiently informed to enable it to defend intelligently, although the state practice treats each count as a distinct cause of action).
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for damages under the Sherman Act a petition which alleged little more than a combination and conspiracy by the defendants to the plaintiff's damage, without setting forth the manner or extent of his injuries, was stricken from the files on motion. 1 And in an action by the government to recover overpayments made to an army-camp contractor, it was held that the petition must contain such reasonable particularization as will indicate upon what matters evidence is to be given, and that a general allegation of fraud, of waste, and the purchasing and reselling of materials and equipment at a profit was too indefinite. 88 Thus, a statement by the plaintiff to the effect that he feels himself generally aggrieved is not sufficient. But the generalized statement offered by the "common counts," so-called, employed in the common law action of assumpsit, and generally under the codes, in spite of the criticism of writers, offers a simple and effective means of stating common, recurring business situations. 3 9 Even in the infrequent type of case such as one to recover penalties under the Safety Appliance Act, an allegation that the violation occurred "on or about" a particular date will be good against an objection in law. 40 In all these cases the court is demanding what is under the circumstances an adequate statement of the fact transaction to identify it with reasonable certainty, not to set forth all its details.
Under the new federal civil procedure there need be no material change in these principles: good and bad craftsmanship in pleading will remain as before. Equity Rule 18, which abolishes technical forms of pleadings, and Rule 25, which specifies the contents of a bill of complaint, may be utilized by making them no longer applicable solely to suits in equity, but to all civil actions. It is true that, like the codes, Rule 25 provides for "a short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of evidence," and that the problem of "ultimate facts," "evidence," or "legal conclusions" has caused difficulties similar to that experienced under 37. Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 Fed. 741 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) . [Vol. 44 state code practice. 4 ' Perhaps an improvement in phrasing can be made. 42 But the expression is familiar, has been given content by many decisions, and possibly will serve our purpose better than a new verbal formula, if we understand the necessity of giving meaning to it by judicial exposition and trial expediency.
Equity Rule 25 also provides that the prayer for relief may be stated in the alternative form. While the plaintiff cannot now claim equitable and legal relief alternatively, 43 if the rule were expanded to cover all civil actions, a plaintiff could, for example, sue for specific performance and seek alternative relief by way of damages as under state code practice. It should be made cear, however, in accordance with the spirit of the unified procedure as pointed out above, that the demand for judgment is no part of the cause of action and limits the type of relief to be granted only in case the defendant defailts of appearance." c) Defendant's pleadings.
Pleas in abatement and bar.
Equity Rule 29 requires defenses "heretofore presentable by plea in bar or abatement" to be made in the answer. A similar practice is found 41. Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524 (1910) (An answer alleging that the "blow post and checking act" violated the Constitution, the grounds being that it is in violation of the commerce clause and a direct burden upon and impedes interstate traffic, impairs the usefulness of defendant's facilities for that purpose and is imposible to observe in carrying mails and in interstate commerce, is insufficient, since it states mere conclusions of Jaw. But see Justice Holmes' dissent); cf. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934) ; noted in (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 25 (A distributor of milk having a "well advertised trade name" sought to enjoin the enforcement of that section of the NXw Ycba= MIL: CONTROL LAW which authorized dealers not within that class to undersell it in New York City. A motion to dismiss should not be sustained, because the complaint, read in the light of the novelty of the measure assailed and of facts of which the court may take judicial notice, stated valid constitutional grounds of attack, since no rational basis for the law is apparent from facts of common knowledge, and if it rests on particular trade conditions in a given locality, these cannot be judicially noticed and are properly the subject of findings based on evidence after trial, in accordance with EQun= RULE 702 
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[Vol. 44 on the law side of the federal courts in states which have provisions, common among the codes, for such compulsory union of defenses. The practice has caused difficulty on the law side, for the code general denial may then put in issue the allegation of diversity of citizenship as the ground of federal jurisdiction-matter which under the common law practice would not have been in issue on pleading to the merits. 40 This tends to force the plaintiff to a trial of the jurisdictional issue in practically all such cases; though, unless there is a real contest on the point, the plaintiff should not be put to the trouble and inconvenience of the proof. 4 Equity Rule 30 tends to prevent such an abuse by requiring the defendant to state his defense to each claim, "avoiding general denials, but specifically admitting, denying or explaining the facts upon which the plaintiff relies, unless he is without knowledge, in which event he shall so state, and this shall be treated as a denial. ' 405 (1929) (plea to the jurisdiction for lack of service conjoined with plea in abatement as authorized by state practice).
46. Since, under the common law practice, if the defendant wanted to contest the grounds of diversity he was obliged to raise it by a plea in abatement, which, of course, was waived by a plea in bar, it often happened that, although it developed at trial that there was no diversity, the courts nevertheless felt themselves powerless to dismiss at that stage, since such matter in abatement had been waived. To correct that, the Act of 1875, 18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. § 80 (1926) , was passed laying upon the courts the duty to dismiss at any stage upon discovering the lack of jurisdiction. This adequately safeguards the courts against collusive or unwarranted attempts to found jurisdiction. See 48. Under code practice, attempts to eliminate general denials have not been successful, as they (like the "common counts," note 39, supra) are convenient pleading shorthand, which the profession is unwilling to give up. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 392-396. It is therefore doubtful whether the new rules should prohibit their use. This, however, is not inconsistent with rules requiring the defendant, if he wishes to raise certain issues, to do so by specific giving the court discretion to hear and dispose of the matter in abatement before the trial of the principal case, is the analogue of the better practice on the law side of the federal courts today.' 0 Thus issue-forming is speeded up by compelling matter in abatement and bar to be set forth at one time; yet there are safeguards against possible inconvenience that might arise by conjoining such matter.
As to pleading to the merits, the state practice has been followed on the law side of the federal courts in construing an answer to determine whether it puts in issue certain allegations of the complaint. 3 It has been held that the following defenses must be specially pleaded: title that has accrued to the defendant subsequent to the commencement of the ejectment action;5I res judicata, 2 release," 3 truth in a slander or libel action,' unconstitutionality of the statute sued upon where facts are needed to demonstrate its invalidity,5s and illegality;"° and that nonperformance of a particular condition precedent could be put in issue only by a special defense, and not by a4 general denial 7 And although pleading; and the issue of federal jurisdiction is certainly one where such obligation can properly be placed on the defendant. EQUny Rurx 25 requires in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends," and it would be appropriate to require this allegation to be pleaded to specially.
49. Compare City of Detroit, Mlich. v. Blanchfield, 13 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), requiring such matter as lack of diversity to be heard before trial on the merits, if at all, with Leonard v. Merchants' Coal Co., 162 Fed. SSS (C. C. A. 2d, 1903) , postponing the hearing on the matter of venue to the trial stage of the principal litigation. And zee Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Keever, 260 Fed. 534 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) 
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YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44 matter constituting a definitive defense could be raised under a general denial, a federal court has permitted it to be pleaded specially.
It is believed that pleading such matters specially affords more adequate notice than a practice which would permit defenses of this type to be raised under a denial, and is in accord with the theory of pleading under Equity Rule 30. A rule defining the practice as to these ordinary and oft recurring issues would be helpful.3 5 Whether a defendant could plead inconsistent defenses at law has varied with the state practice. 6 0 Equity Rule 30 permits the defendant to "state as many defenses, in the alternative, regardless of consistency," as he deems essential, and this would seem to be the better rule for the new procedure. 6 1
Counterclaims
On the law side this matter has been governed by the state practice, 2 which is often technical and confusing63 On the other hand, Equity Rule 30, if extended to apply to all civil actions, furnishes a simple and satisfactory guide in general accord with the modern notions on counterclaims: the defendant must set up any counterclaim arising out of the transaction sued on, and may set up any set-off or counterclaim which could be the subject of an independent suit; and parties may be brought in when necessary, if they are subject to the court's jurisdiction. 360 (1922) , for an authoritative exposition of the rule. It was subsequently amended in 1925 to permit the bringing in of third parties. For materials on the modern developments affecting counterclaims, see 2 Clark, op. cit. supra note 63, at 511-512.
d) Reply and Rejoinder
Equity Rule 31 does away with the necessity of a reply or of further pleadings after the answer is filed, except that a set-off or counterclaim must be pleaded to; yet permits the court to order a reply in its discretion. On the other hand, at law the question whether a reply is needed to controvert new matter in the answer, not constituting a set-off or counterclaim, has varied with the state practice,' which has even been followed where it deprives the judge of the discretionary power to order a replication. 6 Confusion can be avoided under the above rule, and yet flexibility can be retained by the discretionary power left with the court.
6 7 e) Objections in Point of Law Since the methods of raising legal objections to pleadings on the law side has depended upon the particular state practice in point, there has been considerable diversity in the methods employed. Thus in some federal courts the demurrer has been used to raise the statute of limitations, even without specifying what particular limitation statute is meant; while in others it cannot be so used. 6 " It has also been employed to attack an unverified plea. 9 Where the general demurrer for substance has been abolished, a demurrer on the ground that the plea is insufficient in law is defective in form; 7 " and a demurrer specifying causes will be . 1925) . Here the defendant pleaded a sealed release. If the plaintiff is to rely on fraud in the execution to avoid the rele_, then it can be proved in the law trial; but if the fraud relied upon is in the inducement, then the issue is to be tried to the judge, usually before the law action, and it is to the interests of all parties and the court that the plaintiff be compelled to state his defews. Actually he was obliged to set forth his objections to the release by a bill of particular. 
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limited to those specified. 71 There has also arisen in some federal courts the problem so troublesome and confusing in state practice of differentiating between demurrers and various forms of motions to strike or expunge. 72 But in others the demurrer has been abolished and a motion may be used to raise all legal objections. 73 This represents some advance in simplicity of procedure, but may be limited in practical effect mainly to a change of name only. A more desirable change is that adopted by the equity rules, following the English practice, by which objections in law can be raised by motion or incorporated in the answer and may be heard in advance of trial in the discretion of the court. 4 In fact discretion as to the time of hearing objections in law has already been asserted on the law side. 75 Even more effective than the Equity Rule might be the adoption of the complete English plan whereby points of law are normally heard at the trial and are only heard in advance of trial by consent of the parties or order of the court, thus limiting the wasteful preliminary hearing, so susceptible of use for purposes of delay, to cases where the decision on the point of law substantially disposes of the whole case. 7 6 Such provisions should also be supplemented by rules for the summary disposition of cases by motions with support- Pa. 1917) . It seems that the federal courts may also exercise their discretion in permitting the losing party on a demurrer to plead over, although the state practice will usually be followed.
Green Under the practice in some states, and hence under the conformity principle in federal cases at law, a distinction is drawn between a motion to make more definite and certain and a motion for bill of particulars,-3 and it has been thought that Equity Rule 20 establishes the same distinction. 79 But since the purpose of securing more accurate information about the case in advance of trial is the same in both, the form of motion should not be important." 0 Such motions no doubt have been useful in securing information which would lessen surprise,8' but since they result in suppiementary pleading, and are hedged about by conditions, "-Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 15 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) (holding that the state practice did not warrant striking out sham pleadings). For the view that the equity practice does not warrant a "speaking" motion see Snsx;s, F mLzmz PnL-crTcn (1934) 82. A motion for bill of particulars will be granted only in so far as it seeks "facts" which could have been pleaded, and not "evidence," since it is a part of, or an amendment [Vol, 44 they are at best inefficient methods of securing accurate pre-trial information. They need to be supplemented by modern methods of discovery. 8 3
III. PARTIES
a) Party Plaintiff-Real Party in Interest
The substantive law must determine who is the holder of a right sought to be enforced, but the manner of the enforcement and the formal party plaintiff may be considered a procedural question.' Thus on the equity side the practice has been that he who has the right is the real party in interest, the person to pursue the remedy;" while on the law side by virtue of the Conformity Act the rule has depended entirely on the applicable state practice. 3 8 But inasmuch as the equity practice has to, the pleading which it amplifies. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 12 F. (2d) 271 (D. Del. 1926) . Such a motion must not be a mere fishing expedition, or seek 85. EQUITY RULE 37. "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought. . . ." This is substantially the original New York Code provision, and is but declaratory of the equity practice which the framers of the code adopted. CLARx, CODE PLEADING 93-97. 86. Where the common law prevailed an assignee could not sue at law. Nederland Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 84 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898 ). But where this rule has been changed by a "real party in interest" statute, the assignee, or partial assignee where timely objection is not made to nonjoinder of the assignor, may maintain the action In his own name. 2d) 961 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) , applying the Colorado practice which apparently distinguishes a legal and equitable assignee, regarding the former but not the latter as a real party in interest. Since the real-party-in-interest provision is an adoption of the equity practice, and the equitable right of a subrogee to sue has been recognized, Turk v. Illinois Cent. Rr. Co., 218 Fed. 315 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914) , it is believed that in the interests of a unified procedure such a distinction is unsound, and that difficulty can be avoided by not making it.
been quite generally adopted in the states, the prevailing rule at law is in harmony with that on the equity side, 87 and hence without causing substantial change in federal practice that part of Equity Rule 37 which deals with the real party in interest may serve as a model for a unified procedure. 8 The phrase, "the real party in interest," used in the equity rules, is one made current by code pleading. It was not a fortunate choice of expression, for it led courts to assume that some "real," in the sense of beneficial, interest was required of a party plaintiff with resulting havoc to various rules of substantive law. But it is now well settled that the phrase refers only to the one given the right of action by substantive law. Thus, for example, a trustee not only may sue, but often may be the only real party in interest to sue on a particular cause of action affecting the trust res. Possibly the phrase has now assumed too familiar and consecrated an aspect to justify attempts at improvement in expression 8 3 Since the holder of the bare legal title is regarded as a real party in interest and may sue in his own name, and as it is his citizenship which is looked to for jurisdiction, a problem often posed along with the one under discussion is the jurisdictional one raised by the assignment of a claim or the appointment of a particular individual as administrator or guardian to defeat or found federal jurisdiction. The assignment of a . 1921), aff'd, 292 Fed. 191 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) Lundberg, 121 U. S. 451 (1837) , applying the New York rule of Con.iderant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 389 (1860) ; and CLAR, COD PLADDNG 96].
88. Adding to the real-party-in-interest clause the statement that an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in his own name tended to confuse the subject at the outset; but in the main the courts have evolved a broad, liberal conception of the real party in interezt. Cr.4,RK, CODE PLEADIn;G 117-130. Therefore since the provision has received specific construction that is satisfactory it may be well to adopt Equity Rule 37 without substantial change.
89. Clark and Hutchins, loc. cit. supra note 84; Cr-.a.r , CODE: PLEADIMG 93-130. [Vol. 44 chose in action to found jurisdiction is now precluded by legislation;90 but apparently resort may be had to the device for the purpose of defeating jurisdiction." And perhaps a policy has been judicially worked out in favor of defeating, rather than in founding, jurisdiction in the guardian and administrator cases. -Here the problem is essentially a broad one of general policy: Should the diversity jurisdiction be curtailed, and if so, shall it be done by virtue of the terms of a procedural rule determining the party plaintiff in an action? 3 b) Capacity On the whole the federal courts at law have followed the state rule as to the capacity of an individual, a foreign executor, administrator, or state officer to sue or to be sued, 9 4 but have not been wholly consistent 183 (1931 ), noted in (1932 (1932) 41 YAz.a L. 3. 639; (1932) 30 M1cH. L. REv. 1341; (1932) 2 IDAHo L. J. 149. But in the converse situation where the appointment was arranged solely to found jurisdiction the attempt was unsuccessful. Cerri v. Akron-People's Telephone Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N. D. Ohio, 1914) . But cf. City of Detroit, Mich. v. Blanchfield, 13 F. ( 2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) . The principles of the Mecorn and Cern cases are not in conflict because 18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. § 80 (1926) directs the dismissal or remand of a suit where jurisdiction is collusively founded, while there is no express legislative policy against the avoidance of jurisdiction. , 50 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) , cert. denied, 284 U. S. 650 (1931) (suit against a foreign executor will not be sustained even if he puts in a general appearance). But if a foreign administrator appears and contests the case a valid judgment can be rendered against him. Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215 (1892).
The state rule on foreign chancery receiver is not followed, however. See infra notes 99, 102, and accompanying text. as to whether it was applied because of the Conformity Act or the Rules of Decision Act." We suggest that the law of the domicile should settle the capacity to sue and defend, and that such capacity should then be recognized by all federal courts. 90 The principle of the rule has already received some recognitionY Further, for a good many purposes the federal courts have regarded themselves as an independent forum, and if they are to have a procedure distinctly their own there would seem to be no theoretical reason why the rule governing capacity to sue or defend should not be uniform-a uniformity settled by the domiciliary law. 98 Such a rule also is extremely important in dealing with receivers. The present federal rule relative to a foreign chancery receiver who has . 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1892) . The Conformity Act was relied on in holding that one adjudged incompetent in New York could not sue in a federal court in that state, though he had acquired a domicile elsewhere and had there been adjudged sane. New York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner, 265 Fed . 204 (C. C. A. 2d,  1920) . But see Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) , holding that if the incompetent's reason is sufficient to understand the nature and effect of his act he may become domiciled in another state, B, despite any law to the contrary of state A which adjudged him incompetent, and having created the requisite diversity by the change of domicile may sue by guardian ad litem in a federal court sitting in state A.
96. Such recognition would not affect substantive rights. A case will illustrate. When a county treasurer of Indiana attempted to sue in a federal court sitting in New York to collect state revenues he was denied the right on the ground that he lacked capacity to sue. Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. S. 18 (1930) .
Under the rule suggested he would have the procedural right or capacity to sue. But if the state of New York has a policy which refuses to enforce the revenue laws of another sovereign, a federal court sitting in that state might follow that rule.
Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) , aWd on other grounds, 281 U. S. 18 (1930). Or conceivably it might feel free to apply its own notions concerning the wisdom of non-enforcement. (For a general discussion of the substantive problem, and a criticism of non-enforcement, see Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 193; Note (1935) 48 H .v. L. lxv. 828.) However, it would recognize that the matter was one to he decided on grounds other than procedural.
The suggested rule would not subject fiduciaries, such as executors and administrators, to suit in a foreign state merely because they were there served with process. See Thorburn v. Gates, 225 Fed. 613 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) . By analogy to service upon a foreign corporation more than the mere presence of the fiduciary would be necessary to secure a judgment binding the estate. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1914) .
97. By a shift in emphasis from "capacity" as established by the law of the forum to "domicile" the Tenth Circuit has in effect recognized the suggested rule. Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) .
98. In suits under foreign death damage statutes which provide that the action is to be brought by the personal representative for the benefit of certain persons, it might be well to recognize any fiduciary properly qualified and accountable, since the right vests in him purely as a formal party. Cf. Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11 (1030); Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 168 U. S. 445 (1897) ; Teti v. Consolidated Ceal Co., 217 Fed. 443 (N. D. N. Y. 1914 ).
[Vol. 44 no other authority than that which arises from his appointment is rigidly one of nonrecognition. 9 But if a receiver is by statute made a "quasiassignee" he may sue in any federal or state court. 100 And the Supreme Court has held most recently in Clark v. Williard' 0 1 that any title that he has must be recognized by ;i state, although it may apply its own law in dealing with him and local creditors. On the other hand, the states have quite generally worked out a more flexible method of dealing with the receiver who cannot claim as a "quasi-assignee." A Tennessee court has said:
"The privilege of suing in jurisdictions other than that of their appointment is almost universally conceded to receivers now, as a matter of comity or courtesy, unless such a suit is inimical to the interest of local creditors, or to the interest of those who have acquired rights under a local statute, or unless such a suit is in contravention of the policy of the forum."' 10 2 But applying the technique of Clark v. Willard the right to sue could well be recognized in all cases, and yet the policy of the forum could be effected, without making the privilege of suit turn upon matters of policy.
Able and eminent criticism has been directed toward the law curtailing the extraterritorial powers of receivers who cannot claim as quasi-assignees. 0 3 But the Supreme Court had said: 100. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516 (1907) (statute authorizing collection construed to make the receiver a quasi-assignee, and thus permit suit in the federal court) ; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 (1912) (his right to sue in another state court is protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution); Laughlin, supra note 99, at 452-460. The system established in Booth v. Clark has become the settled law of the federal courts, and if the powers of chancery receivers are to be enlarged in such wise as to give them authority to sue beyond the jurisdiction of the appointing court, such extension of authority must come from legislation and not from judicial action."' 1 0 4
The opportunity is now afforded the Court in the new rules to modernize this procedure along the lines here suggested. 105 With regard to suits by and against partnerships and unincorporated associations, the federal courts at law have in general followed the state practice." 0 6 But in the Coronado case' when it appeared to the Supreme states have jurisdiction to administer the affairs of a corporation in receivership see Wickersham, Primary and Ancillary Receiverships (1928) La. 1912) . The trustee in bankruptcy of an unincorporated association has been permitted to sue a member at law. Coyle v. Mlorriz-dale Coal Co., 284 Fed. 294 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'd, 289 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) . A judgment obtained against a partnership as an entity in a state court has been recovered on in a federal court sitting in another jurisdiction. East Denver Municipal Irr. Dist. v. Doherty, 293 Fed. 804 (S. D. N. Y. 1923), extensively discussed in Magruder and Foster, Jurisdiction Over Partnerships (1924) 113 (1933) , held that a voluntary association, unless authorized by statute, had no capacity to sue to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
107. United Aline Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 390 (1922) . "Though such a conclusion as to the suability of trade unions is of primary importance in the working out of justice and in protecting individuals and society from pos.ibility of oppression and injury in their lawful rights from the existence of such powerful entities [Vol. 44 Court that a federal substantive right would otherwise be impaired, it treated a defendant unincorporated association as an entity, though the state court of the forum had earlier refused to recognize the association as such. The rule of this case and of state procedural statutes which recognize as an entity those groups which act as units seems desirable. 105 To be generally effective in cases where jurisdiction must be founded upon diversity of citizenship the new procedure should modify the present federal rule°9 which refuses to endow such a unit with citizenship, but requires the citizenship of its members to be looked to. And there is evidence that the rule is undergoing change, for the Supreme Court recently treated a sociedad en comandita organized under Porto Rican law as a citizen and resident of Porto Rico for purposes of federal jurisdiction. 110 Such treatment might well be accorded to associations acting as trade unions, it is after all in essence and principle merely a procedural matter." For a discussion of this case and the general problem involved see Sturges, Uninvorporated Associations as Parties to an Action (1924) The class suit offered an avenue of escape at times, for in such a suit only the citizenship of.the representatives is looked to. Jurisdiction is not ousted by failure of diversity as to members of the class represented but not made parties. See (1933) 33 COL. L, Rrv. 363-365; 1 FosTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1920) 703, 705-706.
As to venue it has been held that a partnership doing business in Nebraska and there recognized as a legal entity is nevertheless not an inhabitant thereof within the meaning of the venue statutes, where the partner', are citizens and inhabitants of Missouri. Sutherland v. United States, 74 F. under American law. Citizenship, for jurisdictional purposes, could be worked out along lines developed in the corporate field.' c) Substitution A liberal policy as to substitution of parties plaintiff or defendant may be hampered by a state rule against amendments stating a new cause of action, coupled with a legalistic view of the "cause of action." The problem may be presented by suit on a policy of life insurance wrongly brought by the administrator of the insured's wife, although she had predeceased the insured, and the policy was, in that event, payable to the insured's heirs. States -with a liberal and desirable policy will permit the necessary substitution, since the insurance company from the first has been apprised of the real claim. The state cases have been in conflict on the principle involved;I"but a federal court at law, torn between the duty of following an illiberal state practice and the federal legislation on amendments, has permitted the substitution2' This is . 507, 138 N. E. 425 (1922) , permitting the substitution of a party petitioner in certiorari proceedings to review tax assessments on the theory that jurisdiction attached by the filing of the application for reduction of the assessment, which was made in the name of the proper party. 
IV. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND PARTIES
At common law the rules on joinder of actions were governed chiefly by the forms of action and not by principles of trial conveniencen Similarly, joinder of parties depended upon what were considered to be their substantive rights, and not on the simplest and quickest ways of getting disputes litigated. Plaintiffs and defendants had to sue and be sued in the same capacity; permissive joinder of parties having a several right or duty, or affected by a common question of law or fact was not tolerated." 6 On the other hand, in equity the test was largely one of trial convenience with a view to settling the entire controversy in one suit. It is true that the objection of multifariousness could be raised either where there was joinder of two or more equitable causes of action, or of parties complainant or defendant who did not possess a common interest or right in the subject-matter in controversy, and that the rule often prevented the joinder of actions or parties to the sacrifice of an efficient dispatch of business." 7 But the concept of an equitable cause of action was in general sufficiently broad to embrace all operative facts dealing with a transaction; and complainants and defendants were often said to have a community of interest when that interest was nothing more than one in a common question of law or fact and a multiplicity of suits would otherwise result." l8 And, fortunately, no rules of thumb on multifariousness developed, for the question was generally said to be one for the court in the exercise of its discretion. Thus the matter stood when the Equity Rules of 1912 were adopted.
Rule 37 adopted the standard code provision for permissive joinder of parties."' It provided that "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as plaintiffs, and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff.... ." And Rule 26 on the joinder of causes of action authorized unlimited joinder of equitable causes of action where there was one plaintiff, and one defendant, or if more than one plaintiff when they jointly possessed the causes of action, and where, if there was more than one defendant, the liability was asserted against all of the material defendants. Thus it will be seen that notions con-cerning joinder of parties produced what limitations exist on joinder of causes. But even in the qualified situations the rule did not arbitrarily prohibit the joinder, but authorized it when administrative grounds appeared therefor. The rule has been said to prohibit nothing which was permissible in chancery practice before its adoption, but to go further and make the whole question merely one of convenience in the administration of justice."° The matter is recognized as a trial problem, and the court is given the authority to order separate trials.
If these rules were extended to govern the new unified procedure, it would still be more liberal than that obtaining in most of the states. This is true because, -while the provisions relative to joinder of parties are not essentially different from those of most states, yet the rule as to joinder of actions has entirely swept away the artificialities of the common law forms of action and of the classifications of joinable actions of most of the codes. 2 ' Recent legislation in New York, New Jersey, California, and Illinois, 2 following the English practice, may, however, furnish the model for a yet more desirable federal system of party joinder. This legislation generally sanctions permissive joinder of plaintiffs where there is a common question of law or fact; joinder of plaintiffs in the alternative; joinder of defendants "against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative," with the proviso that each defendant need not be "interested as to all the relief prayed for, or as to every cause of action included in the proceeding against him"; and authorizes third parties to be brought in, who were or would be liable to any party to an action. Now these provisions have proved feasible and desirable both in the state courts and on the law side in the federal courts, as notably in those sitting in New York."
But the old restrictive code section on joinder of causes of action was retained in New York and California. The anticipated trouble developed, and after fifteen years of confusion in New York the legislature has now repealed that section and substituted one authorizing unlimited joinder of actions, and giving the court discretion to direct a severance of the action or separate trials.1 -4 In the recent Illinois Act, profiting by the New York experience, this difficulty had been avoided from the beginning.'-In dealing with the problem of intervention, it might be advisable that the new procedure be of broader scope than Equity Rule 37 which requires the intervention to "be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding."' With respect to representative actions, Equity Rule 38 can be extended and applied to all actions whenever a few individuals can be truly said to represent a class 2 Where a number of persons have been injured by fraud or by breach of shippers' contracts, it has been thought that there is properly no class suit, for each claim is of a personal nature.3 s And it has been strongly doubted whether any representative suit can be maintained at law; 2 but the contrary has been held 0 It is believed that the 
1935]
1321
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44 problem is to determine whether there can be adequate representation in the type of action and not whether it is a "legal" or "equitable" action.
Third party practice, a relatively recent development, has received considerable attention from commentators, and its utility has been pointed out.' 1 3 But the federal procedure raises one problem that is peculiar to it. That is the problem presented by Strawbridge v. Curtis.' If we assume a case between A and B properly brought in federal court, under the doctrine of that case, shall we require diversity between B and C, where B wishes to bring C in as a third party? Tentatively, it seems to us unwise to extend the rule of that early case to cover a procedural device which is just developing and which affords to litigants and courts an opportunity of disposing of a litigious situation in one action; and furthermore, such an extension would deprive B of a valuable procedural remedy which he would enjoy if A had chosen the state forum, assuming that there is a third party practice in the state. 1 3 3 - 133. The Supreme Court has appreciated that litigation involving third party practice deserves treatment peculiar to it, that the litigation should not be dismembered. For when A sued B in tort in the state court, and B brought in C to recoup against the latter under an insurance contract and there was diversity between B and C it was assumed that this presented a separable controversy and thus the entire suit would go into federal court on removal, instead of just the B-C litigation which would have been the case had this been regarded as a separate action. See City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U. S, 140 (1934) . There was diversity between A and C, but this is immaterial, for there is no litigation between them. Lowry & Co., Inc. v. National City Bank of New York, 28 F. (2d) 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) .
It has been held that there must be diversity between B and C or that some other jurisdictional ground exist before third party practice can be invoked in federal court. Wilson v. United American Lines, 21 F. (2d) 872 (S. D. N. Y. 1927); Sperry v. Keeler Transportation Line, 28 F. (2d) 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1928). Assuming that these cases have not Improperly interpreted the implications of Strawbridge v. Curtis, still it would seem that the Supreme Court might by rule restrict the doctrine of the case to prevent impairing the utility of the device. The Court has restricted the doctrine in situations where it was thought advisable to dispose of an entire situation. Judge Blatchford permitted a defendant to bring in and substitute a third party for himself, although there was no diversity between them. Harris v. Hess, 10 Fed. 263 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882) (jurisdictional point assumed). And it is well settled that where the substitution is made, the original jurisdiction is not defeated. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U. S. 236 (1886); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U. S. 112 (1894) (in these cases the third party came in voluntarily). Diversity is not required for intervention, the converse of third party practice, SmxncNs, op. cit. siepra note 34, at 684; nor for cross suits between defendants, Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 Fed. 166 (C. C. D. Mont. 1906) (in a water right suit defendants could litigate among themselves their priorities); SirmK~s, id. at 667. If there is diversity between a
In concluding this r~sum6 of the more important problems affecting pleadings and parties which the new federal civil procedure must face, we would again emphasize the tentative nature of our suggestions of details. It is obvious that considerable variation in detail is possible and still the essentials of the reform will be secured. In fact if the vital provisions for a completely united procedure with clear specifications as to jury trials and waiver thereof are adopted, and if flexible rules as to pleadings and parties, leaving much to the discretion of the trial court, are drafted, we shall feel that the reform is assured of success, whatever the detailed provisions may be. It is clear, too, that with the considerable research and interest in procedural reform which has developed in recent years, there is very close to unanimity of opinion on many, perhaps most of the objectives to be sought in these points of detail. This is an auspicious time for the new procedure and, thanks to the decisive leadership now assumed by the Supreme Court, its promise is most bright.' 3 4 stakeholder and the claimants, the court may proceed to a decree though the real controversy is between the claimants and there is no diversity between them. Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, S F. Supp. 870 (N. D. Okl. 1934) . Thus, if the third-party litigation i3 regarded as auxiliary to the main suit the jurisdictional amount and grounds become immaterial.
134. Since this article went to press and on June 3, 1935, the Supreme Court promulgated an order appointing its Advisory Committee on the new rules with the Honorable William D. Mitchell as Chairman and the senior author hereof as member of and Reporter to the Committee. The warning given in the text as to the tentative nature of the conclusions here set forth should be reiterated, and it should, of course, be clear that thee are but the private and unofficial views of the authors.
